# What do they think they are doing?

When Security meets
Usability...

#### Do you use Webmail?









### Do you use E-Mail for private stuff?

### Do you use Social Networking sites?

Have you ever downloaded your address book to a Social Networking site?




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Or click here and we can send the emails for you.

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Done



#### **Get Address Book**

Enter your Yahoo details below. On the next page you will be able to select who to connect with.

Yahoo Email Address: testflixster@mail.yahoo.com

Yahoo Password:


Continue >



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### unexpected invitations



<slashdot>

# Spamming in plain sight!



#### **Get Address Book**

Enter your Yahoo details below. On the next page you will be able to select who to connect with.

Yahoo Email Address: testflixster@mail.yahoo.com

Yahoo Password:

Continue >


YAHOO! Mail

Note: Flixster does not store this information in any way.

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# Phishing in plain sight!

## "But hey, it's common practice!"



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### It's all about trust.

# It's about what people think is happening.

"Digital identity systems must be designed so the disclosure of identifying information is limited to parties having a necessary and justifiable place in a given identity relationship."

(Kim Cameron, The Laws Of Identity)

"Nor were users clamoring for a single Microsoft identity service to be aware of all their Internet activities. As a result, Passport failed in its mission of being an identity system for the Internet."

(Kim Cameron, The Laws Of Identity)

## Flixster and LinkedIn?

### justifiable

#### engineer user trust



#### **Get Address Book**

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Yahoo Email Address: testflixster@mail.yahoo.com

Yahoo Password:

Continue >

YAHOO! Mail

Note: Flixster does not store this information in any way.

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#### <concern>

### Will Flixster store my credentials?


</concern>



Note: Flixster does not store this information in any way.

Continue >

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#### **Get Address Book**

Enter your Yahoo details below. On the next page you will be able to select who to connect with.

Yahoo Email Address: |testflixster@mail.yahoo.com Yahoo Password: | Continue > |



Note: Flixster does not store this information in any way.

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### http://

AMERICAN

Cartes

#### <concern>

That's a lot of financial information. Do I trust the Internet with it?

"For security reasons, the information you enter into this Web form will never be transmitted over the Internet."

### http://

#### users trust content

#### reputable sites teach

## even if the content is implausible

"For security reasons, the information you enter into this Web form will never be transmitted over the Internet."

### <idea>

# can content be an indicator?

# personalize your bank's appearance!



#### <teaching>

"If it's your photo, then it's safe to enter your password!"

# 

#### Schechter, Dhamija, Ozment, Fischer (2007): The Emperor's New Security Indicators

#### reputable sites teach

# disregard other indicators

#### users trust content

"The photo server will be back up shortly. We're sorry for the inconvenience."

#### attack successful

## < Browsers>

## Downs, Holbrook, Cranor (2006): Decision Strategies and Susceptibility to Phishing

# mental models meet security indicators

# "Huh, I'm really not certain, but I'm intrigued by it."

"Well, I mean, I'm figuring like, based off what it seemed like an encrypted page kind of, I don't know, like walks out or crypts into the circle so that it can't be read."

#### <wisdom>

#### Web Site Certified by an Unknown Authority





Unable to verify the identity of people.w3.org as a trusted site.

Possible reasons for this error:

- Your browser does not recognize the Certificate Authority that issued the site's certificate.
- The site's certificate is incomplete due to a server misconfiguration.
- You are connected to a site pretending to be people.w3.org, possibly to obtain your confidential information.

Please notify the site's webmaster about this problem.

Before accepting this certificate, you should examine this site's certificate carefully. Are you willing to to accept this certificate for the purpose of identifying the web site people.w3.org?

Examine Certificate...

- Accept this certificate permanently
- Accept this certificate temporarily for this session
- O Do not accept this certificate and do not connect to this web site







OK

### <speculation> "Possible Reasons for this Error" </speculation>

## <jargon> Certification Authority ... Certificate </jargon>

## <jargon> server misconfiguration </jargon>

#### <oops>

there might be an attack, and it is possibly malicious

</oops>

#### (This dialogue might be the last line of defense against an attack.)

### <impossible> Please contact the site's webmaster </inpossible>

## <impossible> you should examine this certificate carefully </inpossible>

#### Web Site Certified by an Unknown Authority





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Examine Certificate...

- Accept this certificate permanently
- Accept this certificate temporarily for this session
- O Do not accept this certificate and do not connect to this web site







OK

 $\overline{\mathbf{v}}$ 

General Details

#### Could not verify this certificate because the issuer is unknown.

#### Issued To

Common Name (CN) people.w3.org

Organization (O) <Not Part Of Certificate> Organizational Unit (OU) < Not Part Of Certificate>

Serial Number 01:E3:F6

#### Issued By

Common Name (CN) CA Cert Signing Authority

Organization (O) Root CA

Organizational Unit (OU) http://www.cacert.org

#### **Validity**

Issued On 05/02/06 Expires On 04/08/06

#### **Fingerprints**

SHA1 Fingerprint F1:A2:7D:F4:90:5D:DE:06:F8:18:71:47:5E:9B:53:BD:3D:67:7F:70

MD5 Fingerprint CD:5F:EF:4D:ED:BC:0D:30:1B:21:70:55:39:2A:BB:E7

#### "Could not verify this certificate because the issuer is unknown."

#### "Issued By"

## Downs, Holbrook, Cranor (2006): Decision Strategies and Susceptibility to Phishing

"Basically that it's kind of like the elevator certificate. For whatever reason, they don't have it. But at that point sometimes when you go into the elevators you can see if their certificate is up to date or if it's not current. And that's kind of what that meant for me."

Elevator Certificate: The writing on the wall that you read while your elevator is in free fall.

#### users trust content

# useless security indicators teach

## disregard advice

#### <attack>

You have attempted to establish a connection with "northwestairlines.112.2o7.net". However, the security certificate presented belongs to "\*.concoursecommunications.com". It is possible, though unlikely, that someone may be trying to intercept your communication with this web site.

If you suspect the certificate shown does not belong to "northwestairlines.112.2o7.net", please cancel the connection and notify the site administrator.

 $\underline{V}$ iew Certificate





### You have attempted to establish a connection with "northwestairlines.112.207.net".

However, the security certificate presented belongs to

"\*.concoursecommunications.com". It is possible, though unlikely, that someone may be trying to intercept your communication with this web site.

### "possible, though unlikely"

#### 

If you suspect the certificate shown does not belong to "northwestairlines.112.207.net", please cancel the connection and notify the site administrator.

#### good advice!

#### 

# In this case: "attacked" by a hotspot

#### "legitimate" attack

### "legitimate" attacks teach

#### users trust content

#### disregard advice

## but they shouldn't need to

### there is often good information available

### there is often good advice to be given

<a href="http://www.w3.org/2006/WSC/">http://www.w3.org/2006/WSC/>

## Web Security Context Working Group

#### What can we tell users to help them make the right decisions?

#### how?

#### hard problems

#### security usability: much research to be done

### What decisions should users make at all?

# What decisions should we keep away from them?

### web user agents are infrastructure

### Whose Web do we change?

### Whose Web might we break?

#### <future>

### platform

#### applications

#### local

(Widgets)

#### remote

(mash-ups)

### ubiquitous

scan print find your kids open your safe turn off the fridge divorce

# Google

#### <security>

</security>

### been there done that

#### e.g., same-origin policy

## Flixster won't get at your Webmail!

### but Flixster got the password!

#### technical defense

#### attack the human!

### people want convenience

#### features

#### the unexpected

#### and they'll get it!

#### help, don't hinder

usability mental models metaphors indicators best practice

#### enable flexibility

author explain exchange read use

#### strategies

### policies

<a href="http://www.w3.org/TR/access-control/">http://www.w3.org/TR/access-control/</a>

### punching holes into the sandbox

#### allow https://\*.w3.org

## read the address book

#### not the inbox


#### first steps!

#### <challenges>

# If TLS confuses people, what will policies do to them?

### How do we give flexibility to users?

### What does all this really mean to users?



### Thomas Roessler tlr@w3.org